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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a new approach to studying how electoral bias in favor 
of one party due to the pattern of districting affects policy choice.  We tie a 
commonly used measure of bias to the theory of party competition and show 
how this affects policy choice. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated 
using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing 
electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies. 
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1 Introduction
One of the central issues in political economy is to understand how electoral
incentives shape economic policy outcomes. The classic view of party compe-
tition initiated by Downs (1957) models electoral competition between parties
that compete for votes by making policy promises. The median voter result that
emerges suggests that it is voter preferences rather than political institutions
that determine policy outcomes.
The new generation of political economy research gives more weight to in-
stitutional di¤erences in determining policy outcomes. A subset of this research
focuses on the policy consequences of electoral systems.1 An inuential line of
empirical work in this area is that by Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) which
looks at how electoral rules shape policy outcomes. They nd that cross-country
di¤erences in electoral rules are correlated with a variety of policy di¤erences.
They argue that this is consistent with how we would expect such rules to shape
political incentives.
This paper develops a new approach that links theory and data to study how
electoral incentives work. The main focus is on how the pattern of districting
a¤ects policy choices. The possibility of partisan gerrymandering is a major
concern in the architecture of democratic systems. A famous example is the
Supreme Court decision Baker vs. Carr in 1962 which outlawed electoral malap-
portionment which favored the Democratic party in the U.S. south. Despite its
importance, there is no accepted framework for studying its consequences in the
context of models of electoral strategy. The literature that measures such bias
has preceded largely in parallel from models that try to understand how policy
decisions get made. The main theoretical result in this paper ties the mea-
surement of districting bias to a theoretical model of policy choice and hence
makes precise how electoral bias a¤ects policy choice. We apply these ideas to
English local government data and show that malapportionment in favor of a
particular party does have policy consequences, leading to more extreme policy
outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section relates
1See, for example, Myerson (1993).
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the paper to a number of literatures in economics and political science. Section
four develops the theoretical approach. Section three develops the seat-votes
relationship implied by the model and states our key identication result. In
section ve we develop an application. Section six concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper ties together ideas in three distinct areas: models of voting with a
mixture of partisan and swing voters, the empirical relationship between votes
and seats, and strategic models of party competition.
We model voting in a world comprising partisan and swing voters. This
old idea was central to the so-called Michigan election studies beginning in the
U.S. in the 1950s. The classic reference Campbell et al (1960) has inuenced
work on voting by political scientists for more than a generation. The main
idea is that the electorate comprises a group of partisan voters who vote for a
particular party. The remainder are independent or swing voters. While the
nature of partisan attachment is still much debated (see Green et al (2004))
the basic framework remains relevant and most survey collected data on voting
behavior uses these categories and hence classies the electorate in these terms.
Districts within a polity can vary in terms of their composition  containing
di¤erent fractions of independents and partisans. This approach sits well with
a probabilistic voting model of the kind that is now popular in the political
economy literature (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000)).
The inuential work by Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) works by classi-
fying electoral systems according to their rules, specically whether they have
majoritarian or proportional representation systems. An alternative approach
is to look at the empirical relationship between seats and votes.2 A variety of
models have been developed to look at this empirically. One popular model
relates s = ln(seat share for one party / seats for others) and p = ln(vote share
for one party / vote share for others) as follows:
s = + p
2Taagepera and Shugart (1989) provides an excellent overview of the political science lit-
erature on electoral systems.
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and derives estimates for  and .3 The parameters have nice interpretations.
The parameter  denotes districting bias since it indicates whether one party
has an advantage over another when votes are divided equally. The parameter 
denotes swing (or responsiveness) and measures the degree to which the system
deviates from proportional representation ( = 1).4
Gelman and King (1994), among others, have emphasized that bias in the
electoral system is a¤ected by the way in which the boundaries of districts are
drawn. This could be because of the way in which independents and partisans
for each party are allocated to each district. The theory developed below shows
precisely how the distribution of partisan voters across districts determines .5
But how do electoral systems measured in this way a¤ect electoral strategy?
If parties maintained xed positions, electoral bias would a¤ect policy only in so
far as it changes the probability that one party wins. However, if policy making
is strategic, then we might expect changes in strategies to attract support. To
study this in theory, we use a model of electoral competition similar to those
introduced by Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1983). Parties are assumed to
represent their partisans and to behave strategically to attract swing voters.
Our model shows how an increase in bias, as measured by  above, will lead a
dominant party to make less e¤ort to court swing voters.
The analysis in this paper contributes to broader debates about the pros
and cons of vigorous political competition.6 In his inuential commentary on
the one-party south Key (1949) argues that In the two-party states the anxiety
over the next election pushes political leaders into serving the interests of the
have-less elements of society, (Key (1949), page 307.) Malapportionment in
favor of one party constitutes one factor that limits electoral competitiveness
and hence could be one factor inhibiting competition. Indeed, the Supreme
court judgement Baker vs. Carr that we referred to above was premised on this
3King and Browning (1987), for example study this relationship for the United States.
4Kendal and Stewart (1950) famously postulated the cube lawfor British elections where
 = 3. The model is developed further in Gelman and King (1994), Quandt (1974) and King
(1989).
5As as we aware, this paper and Coate and Knight (2005a,b) are the rst to give an
underlying foundation for the the seats-votes curve in such terms.
6See Stigler (1972) for an early discussion.
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being the case.
But it is di¢ cult to establish empirically whether political competition mat-
ters. Strategic models of political competition suggest that realized political
outcomes such as seat shares for one party are likely to be endogenous.7 One
possibility is to nd an instrument for political competition using an feature of
the political landscape. For example, Besley, Persson and Sturm (2005) use
the civil rights acts which struck down voting restrictions in the U.S. south as
instruments. An alternative would be to show that some parameters of the
electoral system are identied independently of policy choices and hence can be
used to measure the state of competition. This is the strategy that we use here.
Here, we focus on bias in inherent in districting. This related to, but distinct
from, the large literature on incumbent bias in congressional elections in the
United States. That begins from the empirical observation that congressional
legislators enjoy a signicantly increased chance of being re-elected over time.8
The policy concern is with whether such bias diminishes the accountability
of legislators to the electorate. This makes a lot of sense in an individualistic
system like the U.S. where the personal vote matters signicantly. In an English
context from which we draw our application, parties that dominate legislative
decision making and hence is less of a factor. Thus the analysis here is a natural
counterpart to the literature on individual legislators.9
7Notwithstanding, there is a long tradition of looking at the policy consequences of electoral
competitiveness in such terms. The U.S. political science literature often uses the Ranney
index based on seats and Gubernatorial voting data. Rogers and Rogers (1999) and Besley
and Case (2003) show that competitiveness measures based on legislative seats are correlated
with policy outcomes in U.S. state level data. This is readily computed using state level data.
Holbrook and van Dunk (1993) experiment with a more disaggregated measure using district
level data on incumbents winning margins.
8See, for example Erikson (1971).
9Some contributions have linked incumbency bias and districting bias. For example, Tufte
(1973) argued that incumbents used gerrymandering in the U.S. to create incumbency bias.
However, these two kinds of bias are conceptually distinct. Moreover, Ferejohn (1977) argued
that behavioral change in the electorate rather than redistricting was most likely responsible
for the increase in incumbency bias in the U.S..
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3 Theoretical Preliminaries
We are interested in understanding the incentives for parties to pick policies
and how this depends on the seats-votes relationship. There are two parties
competing for o¢ ce by choosing policies. Policies a¤ect the extent to which
they can attract support from independent (or swing) voters.
3.1 Preferences and Actions
The economy comprises three groups of citizens denoted by  2 fa; 0; bg. These
labels denote the loyalties that the citizens have to two parties labelled a and
b with type 0citizens not being attached to a party. We assume that there are
 voters of type 0 and (1  ) voters of the other two types. We will refer to
type 0 voters as swing voters and the others as partisan voters.
The citizensutility depends on an L-vector of policies y1; :::; yL that a¤ect
their utility. The set of feasible policies is denoted by Y . Citizens also have an
additional additive component to their utility which depends on which party is
in o¢ ce. The latter is also the primary basis of party loyalty.10 Let 
 (> 0)
denote the utility that a partisan voter has from having his own preferred party
in o¢ ce, i.e.,
V (; y) +  (; )
 for  2 fa; bg and  2 fa; 0; bg
where  (0; ) = 0 always and  (; ) = 1 if  =  and zero otherwise. Let
y () = argmax
y2Y
V (; y)
denote the optimal policy of type .
3.2 Politics
Two parties compete for election. We suppose that their memberships com-
prise only partisan citizens and that they maximize the average welfare of their
10This could correspond to a behavioral model of party loyalty viewing party attachment
as something akin to support for a football team or else it could represent unmodeled xed
policy preferences on key issues such as state ownership.
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members. For z 2 [V (0; y (0)) ; V (0; y ())], consider the following Pareto
e¢ ciency problem for  2 fa; bg:
V^ (z; ) = argmax
y2Y
V (; y)
subject to
V (0; y)  z:
This picks the best level of utility for the party subject to delivering a certain
utility level for the swing voters. Let y^ (z; ) be the policies generated by this
program.
We model parties as competing by picking utility levels from the range
z 2 [ V (0; y(0)) ; V (0; y()) ]
anything else would be ex post Pareto dominated: This begs the question of
whether parties can commit to o¤ering something other than their ideal policy.
This could be nessed by assuming that candidate selection is a commitment
device as in Besley and Coate (1997) or Besley, Persson and Sturm (2005) or
by assuming that parties play a repeated game with the voters as in Alesina
(1988).
Let v be the utility level being o¤ered to the swing voters by party  2
fa; bg. We use   to denote the other party. Let V (z; ) = V (y^ (z; ) ; )
for  2 fa; bg be the policy related utility of a partisan voter when the other
party is in o¢ ce and has o¤ered a utility level of z to the swing voters.
We assume that type a and type b voters remain loyal to their parties. The
swing voters weigh up their utility from voting for each party. We model them
using a fairly standard probabilistic voting model of the kind used extensively
in Persson and Tabellini (2000). Swing voter utility is a¤ected by two shocks,
an idiosyncratic shock ! which has distribution function F (!) and an aggregate
shock  with distribution function H (). Thus a swing voter with shocks (!; )
prefers party a over party b if:
! +  + [va   vb] > 0:
Voters are distributed in a continuum of districts. We assume that the fraction
of swing voters is the same in each. However, each may contain a di¤erent
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fraction of partisan voters. Specically, suppose that (1 + ) =2 of partisan
voters support party a in any particular district where  is distributed on

; 

where    1 and   1, with mean . Let G (;) be the distribution
function of  across districts. The shape of this distribution will be important
in a¤ecting electoral incentives. It reects the pattern of each partys core
support across districts and the extent to which it is concentrated in particular
seats.
4 Votes and Seats
The model can be used to generate a theoretical seats-votes relationship. First
observe that party a wins a seat in which it has an advantage in terms of partisan
voters of  if and only if:
 [1  F (    [va   vb])] + (1  )

1 + 
2

>
1
2
;
i.e., it obtains more than half the votes. Using this, it is straightforward to see
that it wins a share of the seats given by:
Sa = 1 G


1   (2F (    [va   vb])  1) ; 

; (1)
which depends on the distribution of partisan voters across districts. Party as
vote share is equal to:
Pa =  (1  F (    [va   vb])) + (1  )

1 + 
2

: (2)
This depends only on the average partisan voters support  and not its distrib-
ution. Substituting (2) into (1) now yields the following theoretical seats-votes
relationship:
Sa = 1 G

  2Pa   1
(1  )

;

: (3)
This reveals the crucial role played by the shape of the distribution function
G (;) and the underlying structuralparameters of the electoral system ,
 and the distribution of . This relationship does not depend on the policy
choices of the two parties which have been substituted out since they a¤ect both
votes and seats in a similar way. This implies that (3) is identied independently
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of the policy choices made by parties. This underpins the empirical strategy
below, where we estimate parameters of (3) which are then used to explain
policy choices.
But how to estimate (3) is not entirely clear. We are interested in particular
in whether we can justify the classic log-odds relationship between seats and
votes in this theoretical framework, i.e. when (3) is the form:
ln

Sa
1  Sa

= +  ln

Pa
1  Pa

(4)
where Sa is the share of the seats accruing to party a and Pa is the share of
the votes for that party. As we discussed above this an intuitive and conve-
nient approach to measuring features of electoral systems. Perfect proportional
representation is given by  = 0 and  = 1. Majoritarian electoral systems
typically yield  > 1 and to the extent that districting favors one party  6= 0.
(The latter represents the fact that one party is favored in seats even if Pa = 12 .)
Even if (4) can be derived we also need to be sure that we can nd parameters
(; ) that rationalize this seats-votes relationship.
We now show that we can indeed make the move from (3) to (4) provided
that the function G (;) takes a particular form. We also show that a (; )
pair can be found to rationalize any such curve. The result is provided in:
Proposition. For any  2 R and  2 R+ there exist  2 [0; 1] and  2 [ 1; 1]
such that if
G (; ) =
exp ()
h 1
1  +
1
1 + 
i 
1 + exp ()
h 1
1  +
1
1 + 
i 
for  2 [  11  ; + 11  ] \ [ 1; 1] then
ln

Sa
1  Sa

= +  ln

Pa
1  Pa

for Pa 2 [ 12 (1   )(1 + );  + 12 (1   )(1 + )]. Moreover the median of the
distribution across seats is
mG  G 1

1
2
; 

= +
1
1  f(; )
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where
f(; ) 

1  exp f =g
1 + exp f =g

:
provided mG lies in the interior of the range for .
We prove this proposition as the implication of a result for a more general
linear seats-votes relationship (of which (4) is a special case) in Appendix I.
The Proposition shows that, for the case where (4) holds, the median can be
decomposed into two parts (i) the mean of  (equal to ) (ii) a factor f (; ) 2
[ 1; 1] which depends upon the bias and swing coe¢ cients calculated from the
seats-votes relationship. This is a useful decomposition since the latter term
isolates the skewness of the distribution of the partisan voters separately from
the mean. The model identies districting bias with skewness in the distribution
of seats and votes. As  moves further away from zero, the distribution G (; )
is more skewed in a well-dened sense.
Since (3) is derived from a theoretical model, this result will help to provide
a link between the measurement of bias and swing in electoral models and policy
incentives. We now show that the parameter mG a¤ects political competition
and hence political equilibrium.
5 Political Equilibrium
Party a wins the election if it takes half the seats. This requires that  be
su¢ ciently high so that:
1 G


1   (2F (    [va   vb])  1) ; 

>
1
2
:
or
 >   [va   vb]  
where  = F 1
 
1
2
 
1 + 1  mG

is an increasing function of the median of the
distribution of .11 The rst term   [va   vb] represents the policy advantage
of party a if it o¤ers more to the swing voters while the second term  is a
11For example, in the case where F () is a uniform distribution on
h
  1
2
; 1
2
i
, then  =
1 

mG.
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measure of the state of political competition. If the median of the distribution
of partisan voters is higher reecting greater concentration of party as core
support, then this is good for party a and makes it more likely that this party
will win. To see this more clearly, assume that H () is uniformly distributed
on  2
h
  12 ; 12
i
. Then the probability that party a wins the election for xed
(va; vb) is:
Pa (+ va   vb) =
8>><>>:
1 if  [+ va   vb]  12
1
2 +  [+ va   vb]
0 if  [+ va   vb]   12 .
(5)
With a su¢ ciently large advantage, party a wins for sure. Otherwise, there will
be an interior solution. From now onwards, we focus on this case. A higher
value of  increases (reduces) the advantage of party a (b):
Parties compete by picking utility levels for the swing voter. Policy choices
form a Nash equilibrium, i.e.
~va = argmaxv2[V (0;y(0));V (0;y(a))]f

1
2 +  [+ [va   vb]]
 

a + V^ (v; a)

+

1
2    [+ [va   vb]]

V (vb; a)g
and
~vb = argmaxv2[V (0;y(0));V (0;y(b))]f

1
2    [+ [va   vb]]
 

b + V^ (v; b)

+

1
2 +  [+ [va   vb]]

V (va; b)g
:
We make:
Assumption1 : V^v (v; ) + V v (v; ) < 0
for all v 2 [V (0; y (0)) ;max fV (0; y (a)) ; V (0; y (b))g] :
This requires that there be su¢ cient conict of interest between the parties and
the swing voters. As shown in Besley (2005), this assumption guarantees that
the game played between the two parties is supermodular and hence that a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium exists. The Nash equilibrium is said to be extremal
if either ~v = V (0; y (0)) or ~v = V (0; y ()) for some  2 fa; bg and is interior
otherwise.
This model motivates the importance of electoral bias to policy making. To
see this, consider an interior solution for both parties. The rst order conditions
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in this case are:

h

a + V^ (~va; a)  V (~vb; a)
i
+

1
2
+  [+ [~va   ~vb]]

V^v (~va; a) = 0
for party a and

h

b + V^ (~vb; b)  V (~va; b)
i
+

1
2
   [+ [~va   ~vb]]

V^v (~vb; b) = 0
for party b.
From this, it is clear that  and hence mG a¤ects electoral incentives. This
provides a direct link (using the Proposition above) between seats-votes bias
and the choice of policy since, as we saw there, the parameters  and  a¤ect
mG.
A political equilibrium is a pair of promises to the swing voters (~va; ~vb) which
form a Nash equilibrium. It is interior when it satises this pair of equations
above. Appendix III gives a simple worked example where the function V^ (~v; )
( 2 fa; bg) is linear. This illustrates the equilibrium. It also shows that ~va is
increasing in  and ~vb is decreasing in .
Given an equilibrium pair of promises to the swing voters, the parties pick
policies to achieve these utility levels. Hence:
y` = y^` (; ~v) (6)
= Y` (; ) = Y^`

; +
1
1  f(; )

:
for  2 fa; bg and ` = 1; :::; L. This shows that electoral bias as represented by
 has an e¤ect on policies indirectly, i.e. via its impact on ~v.
The theoretical direction of electoral bias on any specic policies is a priori
ambiguous. First, it depends on how it impacts on the promise to swing voters
that the party makes and second, on the partys preferences over policies. There
may be some issues on which a party does not mind giving ground to the swing
voters while on others the conict of interest between parties and swing voters
is strong. This would be true for policies which a¤ects the rents that parties
earn from holding o¢ ce. Hence, while we do expect bias to matter especially
on policies that matter to swing voters, it is an empirical question where this
has bite.
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6 An Application
This section develops an application of the theoretical framework using data
from local government in the U.K..
6.1 Background and Data
Our application comes from local government in England for the period 1973-
98.12 These are charged with responsibility for provision of a variety of local
public services. In all parts of England, they deal with public housing, local
planning and development applications, leisure and recreation facilities, waste
collection, environmental health and revenue collection. Councillors are elected
to serve on District Councils on a geographical basis. The basic geographical
unit is a ward, generally returning between one and three council members, and
usually three. Ward boundaries are determined by a politically independent
commission which carries out electoral reviews in each local government area at
periodic intervals.13 In all types of authority, elections are on a rst-past-the-
post basis, returning the candidates with most votes, irrespective of whether or
12The system is somewhat complex involving a mixture of single and two tier authorities.
There is a single tier of government in London and other metropolitan areas since 1988. Since
1995, there has been a move towards a single tier system throughout England via the creation
of shire authorities. However, London and metropolitan areas before 1988 and all shire
(rural) areas before 1995 and most of them since responsibilities are split between two levels
- a higher level county council and a lower level district council. Where such a split exists the
current allocation of functions is roughly as follows. District councils deal with public housing,
local planning and development applications, leisure and recreation facilities, waste collection,
environmental health and revenue collection. County councils deal with education, strategic
planning, transport, highways, re services, social services, public libraries and waste disposal.
Where there is a single tier it typically covers all of these functions (although in London and
metropolitan areas transport, re and waste disposal are handled by joint bodies). In 1990,
the break down was 12 inner London boroughs, 20 outer London boroughs, 36 metropolitan
districts and 296 shire districts.
13Electoral cycles vary depending on type of authority. County councils and London bor-
oughs elect all members at a single election every four years. Metropolitan districts elect by
thirds, returning a third of their members on a rotating basis in each of three out of four years.
Shire districts, whether unitary or not, have a choice to opt for either system and changes
between the two systems are permitted.
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not any gain an absolute majority.
The taxing authority of these local governments is limited with only around
25% of nance being raised locally. The remainder is covered by grants from
central government. There are three main parties Conservative, Labour and
Liberal Democrats. The remainder of seats are placed under a catch-all category
otherswhich mainly comprises independents. The Conservative party (the
party of Margaret Thatcher) is a right wing party and has a reputation for
desiring smaller government and lower taxation. The Labour party (the party
of Tony Blair) is the traditional party of the left while the Liberal Democrats
are mostly viewed as mildly left of centre. We would expect these preferences
to show up in the policy chosen under di¤erent patterns of political control.
We classify a party as being in control if it holds more than 50% of the
seats on the council. A small number of local authorities are in the hands of
independents in which case we classify them as othercontrol. Finally, there
are councils that are not controlled outright by anyone no overall control.
Since many local governments have multiple competing parties, they do not t
the theoretical model particularly well. Hence, the analysis is conned to those
which are two partyauthorities in the sense that two parties controlled more
than 75% of the seats in every year between 1973 and 1997. This gives a sample
of 150 local authorities compared to the universe of 364. We will use data to
construct various measures of districting bias in each local authority.14
Table 1 reports key political outcomes for this period for the 150 local au-
thorities that we use. The table gives the mean of actual political control over
our sample. It also gives the break down of our sample by region and by class
of local authority. In spite of restricting the sample to 150 two-party authori-
ties, a broad regional distribution remains as well as a selection of the di¤erent
authority types. Since we have four party groupings, there are six possible
varieties of political competition. The distribution of the sample over these
types among the authorities is given in the table.
Our focal period for which we have policy data is 1980-1998. For each
local authority, we have nance data and expenditure. We also get employment
14For an earlier study of seats-votes bias in English local elections and references to previous
literature on that subject, see Johnston, Rallings and Thrasher (2002).
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in each local authority administration for full time and part time workers. We
also have some background socioeconomic data constructed from the Census and
other sources. The main economic controls that we use are (log of) household
income in each district, the level of unemployment and the (log of) population.
Since 1994, we have data available on a range of outcomes from the Audit
Commission, set up in 1992 to monitor local government. The sample means
of the key controls and policy outcome variables used in the study are given in
Tables 1 and 2.
6.2 Empirical Method and Results
The above discussion motivates the following two-stage empirical approach. We
rst use data on seats and votes to estimate parameters of the seats-vote re-
lationship  and . We then use the estimated parameters to see whether
electoral bias a¤ects policy outcomes.
6.2.1 Bias
Let j denote a jurisdiction and  an election date. There are four parameters
to the distribution of partisan voters across districts,
 
j ; j ; j ; j

. We
assume that j =  and j =  are common parameters across districts
15 ,
j = j is indexed by j, the local jurisdiction, but constant over time and we de-
compose j = j+j into a xed authority component j and a time-varying
authority term jt. We assume jt is an innovation unknown to political agents
at the time of policy decisions and distributed independently of (j ; ; j) so
that parties can be assumed to take decisions based on f (j ; ) =
h
1 exp(j=)
1+exp(j=)
i
.
We then estimate the equation:
ln

Saj
Sbj

= j +  ln

Paj
Pbj

+ "kj : (7)
15The proof of the Proposition in Appendix I establishes that it is always possible to nd
authority specic j and common  compatible with the estimated seats-vote relationship.
Though it is not necessary to have common  making the assumption removes an issue of
coe¢ cient heterogeneity in the policy regressions.
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The estimated parameters are then used to construct f (j ; ). This is used in
the next section to explain economic policy choices.
Our data come from England where there are four main party groupings 
Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and Independents. As we discussed
above, we conne our estimation to 150 local authorities that exhibit essential
two party competition over our data period. This gives 150 bias parameters
j and a swing parameter . In the smaller sub-set of Conservative-Labour
competition we estimate only 108 bias parameters j . The relationship between
votes and seats is illustrated for these two cases in Figures 1 and 2. In each
case, we also plot the regression line. These plots suggest a fairly good t for
the log-odds relationship between seats and votes.
Results from estimating (7) for elections between 1973 and 1997 are given
in Table 3. As we would expect in a majoritarian system, the control of seats
varies more than proportionately with changes in votes, i.e. the responsiveness
parameter  exceeds one. The point estimate is 1.72 in the larger sample and
2.21 in the smaller one.
Using the results from (7), we recover the j parameter for each of our local
authorities.16 A Wald test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the values of
j are equal across local authorities in either sample. We use these estimated
values of j to construct our measure of districting bias when party r controls
in local authority j at time t as:
biasrjt = (2rjt   1) f (j ; ) :
For sake of illustration, Figure 3 gives the distribution of (average) bias of
the controlling party in each local authority for the sample of 150 two-party
authorities. Unsurprisingly, this bias tends to be positive  parties are in
control more often when bias is in their favour. This is borne out by looking
at the di¤erence in political control in districts with bias and nding that the
16For ve of our local authorities: East Cambridgeshire, Hackney, Islington, Southwark and
Surrey Heath, the second placed party received no seats in one or more years. This would
not be a problem except for the log formulation of the seats-votes relationship. In these
cases, we estimates the bias parameter on the years where seats are not zero for the second
placed party and set it to missing in years when the second placed party receives no seats. In
practice, this is a very minor issue.
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larger party tends to have a large advantage over its second placed rival.
6.2.2 Policy
Let yr`jt be policy outcome ` in jurisdiction j in year t when party r 2 fa; bg is
in o¢ ce where ` = 1; :::; L. Our basic policy equations are of the form:
yr`jt = rj + `j + `t + `r (2rjt   1) f (j ; ) + rjt (8)
+`x`jt + r`jt
where rc are region dummy variables, `c are dummy variables for the type
of authority, `t are year dummy variables, rjt = 1 if party r is in o¢ ce in
district j in year t, and x`jt is a vector of exogenous regressors varying at the
jurisdiction level that also a¤ect policy.
On the whole swing voters might be expected to have more centrist pref-
erences. If this is true, then parties would tend to moderate their policy
preferences when facing less electoral bias in their favor. Thus, our empiri-
cal specication allows for districting bias to have a di¤erent e¤ect on policy
depending on which party is in o¢ ce as will be true if parties have di¤erent
policy preferences.17
The theory suggests that policy choices depend upon the median of the
distribution of  in jurisdiction j, i.e.
j = j +
1
1  f (j ; ) :
This implies that the error term in (8) contains:
r`jt = `r (2rjt   1)j + 'r`jt:
where j is treated as a random e¤ect. We will also allow the distribution of
'r`jt to be heteroskedastic.
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17This is clear from the example solved in Appendix III.
18Since we assume a xed  and district-specic j Appendix I proves that that it is
consistent with theory to have constant  and then j deterministically related to j and .
In that case we would interpret the estimated coe¢ cient on f(j ; ) as coming through j . In
that the case the random e¤ect captures authority level specic e¤ects germane to the policy
in question. If  is not constant then j could vary orthogonally to f(j ; ) and this would
be absorbed by the random e¤ects. In this case, we have a random coe¢ cient which induces
heteroskedasticity in the error term. Our estimation procedure covers both possibilities.
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The actual estimation is laid out in detail in Appendix II. It shows how we
deal with two further issues. First, we need to allow for the generated regressor
bias in the standard errors due to the fact that j and  are estimated in (7).
Second, since there are four parties rather than two, we estimate these policy
equations for di¤erent (a; b) pairs in di¤erent jurisdictions.19 Moreover, since
we are studying competition between the main two parties in every jurisdiction,
we need to introduce a third possibility (no overall control) in which neither
party has a majority of the seats. This will be the baseline category in the
estimations that follow.
We take total local authority expenditures per capita as a core example to
illustrate our ndings. These are reported in Table 4. We begin in column (1)
of Table 4 by showing the relationship between bias and expenditure with only
region, class of authority and year dummies as controls, without di¤erentiating
between party control and estimating by OLS (with standard errors corrected
for the use of generated regressors). The relationship between bias and total
spending is positive and signicant incumbents with more bias in their favor set
higher expenditures. This relationship holds up when controls are introduced
for grants received, income, unemployment and population as is done in column
(2). This reduces the coe¢ cient on bias considerably but it remains signicant.
The coe¢ cients on these controls are sensible higher grants being correlated
with higher expenditures. Column (3) adds in dummies for political control
but no interactions between this and bias. Conservative party control reduces
expenditures while control by any of the other parties increases it, although not
signicantly in the case of other control.20 The coe¢ cient on bias falls further
in this column, but remains positive and signicant, albeit at less than 5%.
Column (4) allows bias to have a di¤erent e¤ect depending on which party
controls the council. The e¤ect of bias for Labour and Liberal Democratic
control is positive and signicant. The sign under Conservative party control
is negative. Thus bias appears to exaggerate the consequences of party control
as measured in column (3). These e¤ects are stronger still when we move to
19To check consistency, we will look at the smaller set of jurisdictions which have only
Labour-Conservative competition.
20The omitted category here is no overall control.
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the random e¤ects estimation in column (5) which deals with the full set of
issues discussed in the context of (8). All e¤ects of bias are larger and more
signicant. Finally, in column (5), we test the robustness of this nding to
looking only at the Conservative-Labour sub-sample. In this instance, bias
leads to expenditure increases only in Labour controlled councils.21
Together these results suggest that bias in favor of the incumbent does have
a signicant e¤ect on the expenditure level in a local authority. It appears
as if, in line with the theory, less bias leads to parties compromising on their
spending preferences higher spending parties reduce their spending and low
spending parties increase it when bias is smaller. The e¤ects are of a reasonable
size. A one standard deviation increase in bias increase spending under Labour
control as much as a 12% increase in average income and leads to a similar sized
reduction in spending under Conservative control.
The remaining tables investigate whether these ndings are an artefact of
picking total expenditure as an outcome measure. From now on we report only
the GLS results in (8). Table 5 concentrates on taxes. These data come from
the audit commission and hence are a smaller sample of years than Table 4.
The rst column is for the size of the local tax. Council taxes are interesting as
they are set locally and highly visible. The tax varies by property value. We
use the tax on a standardized property (Band D). Column (1) shows that there
is a positive and signicant e¤ect of bias on the size of the tax under Labour
control a one standard deviation increase in bias leading to a 1% increase in
the size of the tax. Column (2) looks at whether bias a¤ects the cost of tax
collection, as measured on a consistent basis by the Audit commission. The
21Consistency of our estimates of `r relies on consistency in estimation of the j and
therefore on number of observed election cycles used for estimation becoming large in each
jurisdiction. In practice the length of this time dimension is fairly small and we need therefore
to recognise the possibility of attenuation bias arising at the second stage as a consequence
of inaccuracy in the estimation of the districting biases j . Note that, as with classical
measurement error, this will make it more di¢ cult for us to establish evidence of an e¤ect.
Appendix II.4 shows that this bias should be a similar proportion of the true value `r across
di¤erent policies ` and suggests a way to estimate the magnitude of the bias. Applying this
formula to results in column (5) suggest that the bias towards zero could be about 49% of the
true coe¢ cient for Labour, 35% for the Conservatives, 15% for the Liberal Democrats and
21% for others.
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e¤ect of bias is not signicant in this case. Column (3) looks at the percentage
of tax collected that is owed to the local authority. There is some evidence here
that those jurisdictions with more bias tend to have lower tax collection e¤ort
regardless of who controls the authority.
Having observed in Table 4 that total expenditures are a¤ected by bias, Table
6 looks at the composition of expenditures. For leisure spending and spending
on parks, we nd e¤ects that parallel the results in Table 4 with Labour favoring
higher spending and Conservatives less. For refuse spending it appears that
bias under Liberal Democratic control increases spending while they spend less
on Transport. As expected, these results indicate that parties do have di¤ering
policy priorities.
Table 7 looks at employment by the local authority. In column (1), we look
at the log of total employment. Again, we nd strong e¤ects of bias di¤erenti-
ated by type of party control. Bias under Labour control leads to increases in
employment while, under Conservative control, it leads to retrenchment. A one
standard deviation increase raises full time employment under Labour control
by 6% and reduces it by around 3% under Conservative control.
In Table 8, we look at a variety of other policy data from the Audit Commis-
sion. Provision of cheap social housing is a typical policy that might appeal to
Labours traditional support but be unattractive to Conservative voters. Col-
umn (1) shows that more bias under Labour control tends to be associated
with greater rent collection in public housing while column (2) shows that there
are lower management costs in public housing as bias increases under Labour
control. There is weak evidence that bias under Labour control reduces rents
while it increases rent under Conservative control (column (3)). There is lit-
tle evidence that bias a¤ects planning and the costs of administering benets
(columns (5) and (6)).
Overall, the results suggest convincing evidence that bias matters for policy
outcomes. Consistent with the theory, the results also suggest that parties try to
appeal more to swing voters by tempering their trueparty preference when
elections are more competitive (districting biases are reduced). Particularly
persuasive in this respect is the nding that electoral bias increases spending
and public employment under left-wing (Labour) control while reducing them
20
under right-wing (Conservative) control.
7 Concluding Comments
Political economy models try to identify how political incentives a¤ect policy
choices. Despite a plethora of theoretical models, there are few e¤orts to build
links to empirical estimation. This paper suggests an approach to doing so
and identies the consequences of districting bias for policy choice. In doing
so it provides a link between three branches of previously distinct research 
empirical models of voter behavior, the relationship between seats and votes
and strategic models of politics. The core idea in the theory is that bias in
favor of one party will make that party less keen to court swing voters and will
therefore slant policies more towards its core supporters.
To illustrate the usefulness of the approach, we have developed an application
to English local government data. We show how the key parameters can be
identied and used to explain policy. In line with theory, there is evidence
that parties moderate their policy stance when they face a stricter electoral
incentive. Finding other ways of linking theory and data in political economy
models provides a fruitful and challenging agenda for further research.
The results presented here also contribute to debates about the consequences
of electoral districting. Beyond the broad choice of electoral rules, the pattern
of districting is one of the key choices in an electoral system. It is no surprise,
therefore, that it generates signicant discussion. This issue has largely been
left alone by the new political economy literature. However, Coate and Knight
(2005a,b) is taking up the challenging problem of optimal districting building
from micro-foundations. The ndings in this paper suggest that understanding
the policy consequences fully requires considering the consequences of districting
for strategies employed by political parties.
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Appendix I Proof of Proposition
The Proposition is proved as an implication of the following lemma.
Lemma. For any  2 R and  2 R+ and for any increasing, surjective ;  :
(0; 1)! R there exist  2 [0; 1] and  2 [ 1; 1] such that if
G(; ) = 1   1

+  

1
2
+
1
2
(1  )(  )

(A.1)
for  2 [  11  ; + 11  ] \ [ 1; 1] then
(Sa) = +  (Pa) (A.2)
for Pa 2 [ 12 (1  )(1 + );  + 12 (1  )(1 + )].
Proof. From (2) the widest possible range for Pa as F (    [va   vb]]) ranges
from 0 to 1 is
1
2
(1  )(1 + )  Pa   + 1
2
(1  )(1 + ):
Suppose that (A.2) holds or equivalently
Sa = 
 1 (+  (Pa))
for Pa 2 [ 12 (1  )(1 + );  + 12 (1  )(1 + )]. This corresponds to (3)
Sa = 1 G

  2Pa   1
1   ; 

and hence (A.1) holds for  2 (  1  ; 1  ). Since, by its denition,  2 [ 1; 1]
then (A.2) can hold across the required range of values for Pa only if   12 .
We need to show that there exists a  2 (0; 12 ] and a  2 [ 1; 1] such
that  can be the mean value of . Suppose that G() takes the form (A.1)
not only on (  1  ; 1  ) but across the widest possible support [0; 1] 
[  11  ; + 11  ] \ [ 1; 1]. The di¤erence between the mean of  and  is
()  0G(0; ) + 1[1 G(1; )] +
Z G(1;)
G(0;)
G 1(; )d   :
Let  = 12 . Then [0; 1] = [ 1; 1] if  2 [ 1; 1]. Hence
()  1 G( 1; ) G(1; ) +
Z G(1;)
G( 1;)
G 1(; )d   :
Now, using the properties of () and  (),
G( 1; 1) = 1   1

+  (
1
2
)

= 1  0;
G( 1; 1) = 1   1 (+  (1)) = 0;
G(1; 1) = 1   1 (+  (0)) = 1;
G(1; 1) = 1   1

+  (
1
2
)

= 1  0:
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where 0   1
 
+  ( 12 )

. Therefore, by substitution,
( 1) = 1  [1  0]  1 +
Z 1
1 0
G 1(; )d + 1
=
Z 1
1 0
G 1(; )d + 0
 (1  0)  1 + 0 = 0
and
(1) = 1  [1  0] +
Z 1 0
0
G 1(; )d   1
=
Z 1 0
0
G 1(; )d + 0   1
 (1  0) + 0   1 = 0
using the fact that 0  G 1(; )  1 for all .
Since () is a continuous function there must therefore be a  2 [ 1; 1]
such that () = 0 as required.
Letting (y) =  (y) = ln

y
1 y

in these formulae gives the expression for
G(; ) in the Proposition and the expression for mG follows by inversion.
Appendix II Estimation
Consider estimation of the model for one performance indicator yit in isola-
tion (allowing us to drop the ` subscript from the performance equation). Let
sit = log

Sait
Sbit

and pit = log

Pait
Pbit

: Consider rstly the basic model in which
incumbent bias e¤ects are the same for all parties. Such a model combines
equations
sit = i + pit + uit i = 1; : : : ; N t = 1; : : : ; T1
yit = witf(i; ) +Xit + it i = 1; : : : ; N t = 1; : : : ; T2
where T1 denotes the number of time periods available to estimate the votes-
seats relationship, T2 the number of time periods available to estimate the per-
formance equation and N the number of authorities in the cross section. Here
sit denotes the log odds of seat share and vit the log odds of vote share for one
party, wit denotes a variable taking values 1, 0 and -1 according to whether that
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party, no party or its opponent have control of the authority and Xit denotes
a row vector of all other relevant variables including time and region dummies
and dummies for party control.
In matrix form write this as
s = D1 + p + u
y = Wf + X + 
in an obvious notation.
II.1 Seats Votes Relationship
Let Z1 = (D1 p). Then  and  are estimated at the rst stage by0@ ^
^
1A = (Z 01Z1) 1Z 01s
=
0@ 

1A+ (Z 01Z1) 1Z 01u:
We use these estimates to construct estimates of the bias variables
f^ = f(^; ^)
= f(; ) + r(; )(Z 01Z1) 1Z 01u + op(T 
1
2
1 ):
where r(; ) denotes the Jacobian matrix (@f=@0 @f=@).
II.2 OLS Performance Regressions
Let Z2 = (Wf^ X). Then second stage OLS estimates are0@ ^O
^O
1A = (Z 02Z2) 1Z 02y
=
0@ 

1A+ (Z 02Z2) 1Z 02 [   Wr(Z 01Z1) 1Z 01u] + op(T  121 ):
Hence, as N; T1 !1,
p
N
240@ ^O
^O
1A 
0@ 

1A35! N  0; A 1O [BO + CO]A 1O 
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where
AO = plim
1
N
Z 02Z2
BO = plim
1
N
Z 02
0Z2
CO = 
2plim
1
N
Z 02Wr(Z 01Z1) 1Z 01uu0Z1(Z 01Z1) 1r0W 0Z2
assuming existence of the appropriate probability limits, taken as N !1.
Consistent estimators of standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, are
based upon corresponding sample moments of the residuals (with appropriate
small sample degrees of freedom corrections):
[Avar
0@ ^O
^O
1A = 1
N
A^ 1O [B^O + C^O]A^
 1
O
where
A^O =
1
N
Z 02Z2
B^O =

NT2
NT2   k

1
N
X
i
X
t
Z 02itZ2it^
2
Oit
C^O = ^O
2

NT1
NT1  N   1

1
N
Z 02W r^(Z 01Z1) 1
"X
i
X
t
Z 01itZ1itu^
2
it
#
(Z 01Z1)
 1r^0W 0Z2:
Allowing incumbent bias e¤ects to di¤er by party involves extending  to
a vector of e¤ects on interactions of f(i; ) with indicators of party control.
Corresponding variance formulae follow by similar reasoning incorporating the
appropriate matrix products.
II.3 GLS Performance Regressions
Note however that there is good reason to expect correlation between observa-
tions within authorities because of the common inuence i. This suggests a
random-e¤ects structure. Suppose E(i
0
i) = 
i and 
^i is a consistent estima-
tor of 
i. Let 
^ denote the block diagonal matrix constructed in the natural
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way from the estimates 
^i. Then we can calculate a feasible GLS estimator0@ ^G
^G
1A = (Z 02
^ 1Z2) 1Z 02
^ 1y
=
0@ 

1A+ (Z 02
^ 1Z2) 1Z 02
^ 1 [   Wr(Z 01Z1) 1Z 01u]
+ op(T
  12
1 ) (A.3)
and, as N; T1 !1,
p
N
240@ ^G
^G
1A 
0@ 

1A35! N  0; A 1G [BG + CG]A 1G 
where
AG = plim
1
N
Z 02

 1Z2
BG = plim
1
N
Z 02

 10
 1Z2
CG = 
2plim
1
N
Z 02

 1Wr(Z 01Z1) 1Z 01uu0Z1(Z 01Z1) 1r0W 0
 1Z2
assuming again that the appropriate probability limits exist.
Consistent estimators of standard errors are based upon corresponding sam-
ple moments of the residuals:
[Avar
0@ ^G
^G
1A = 1
N
A^ 1G [B^G + C^G]A^
 1
G
where
A^G =
1
N
Z 02
^
 1Z2
B^G = A^G
tr(^G^
0
G
^
 1)
NT2   k
C^G = ^G
2

NT1
NT1  N   1

1
N
Z 02
^
 1W r^(Z 01Z1) 1"X
i
X
t
Z 01itZ1itu^
2
it
#
(Z 01Z1)
 1r^W 0
^ 1Z2:
It remains only to describe the calculation of 
^. We set 
^i = ^1 IT2 +
^2 1T21
0
T2
for all i, estimating ^1 and ^2 from the within- and between-authority
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sample moments of the pooled OLS residuals ^O according to the formulae in
Baltagi (1995, p.182).
II.4 Small sample bias
Consistent estimation of  requires T1 ! 1 so that estimation error in ^ dis-
appears. For nite T1, estimation imprecision in ^ creates an e¤ective mea-
surement error issue at the stage of the performance regressions and therefore
small sample attenuation bias in estimates of  (and ). Specically, taking the
expectation of the leading term in the expression for (A.3)
E
240@ ^G
^G
1A  
0@ 

1A35
= E(Z 02
^
 1Z2) 1Z 02
^
 1 [   Wr(Z 01Z1) 1Z 01u]
' (Z 02
^ 1Z2) 1
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(A.4)
The proportional bias in estimation of  is independent of the performance
indicator in question (except in so far as that a¤ects the sample which can be
used for estimation).
Note also that a putative estimate of the bias is available since the variance
of u can be estimated using the seats-votes data and the rst stage regression
results - specically, u^0u^=NT1 consistently estimates E (u0u). This could be
used as the basis of small-sample-bias-corrected estimates of  and . However,
while this should reduce small-sample bias it is not clear how it would a¤ect
precision of the estimator and it is quite possible that mean square error could
increase. We prefer therefore to report the uncorrected but consistent estimates
while noting the possible magnitude of bias implied by (A.4).
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Appendix III Political Equilibrium: A Linear
Example
Let:
V^ (va; a) =  a   aava
and
V (vb; b) =  a   abvb
and
V^ (vb; b) =  b   bbvb
and
V (va; a) =  b   bava:
We assume that aa > 0 and bb > 0. The counterpart of Assumption two is
aa >  ab and bb >  ba. Then, the rst order conditions can be solved (at
an interior solution) as:
va = a   
2
+ avb
and
vb = b +

2
+ bva
where a =
1
2

1 + abaa

; b =
1
2

1 + babb

and  =



  12 : Thus, the
reaction functions are linear with slope coe¢ cient a and b respectively. Then:
~va =
a + ab
(1  ab)
  1
2

1  a
1  ab

and
~vb =
b + ba
(1  ab)
+ 
1
2

1  b
1  ab

:
where 1  ab > 0.
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Variable Mean
Characteristics
ln Average Income 8.7144
(0.3285)
ln Population 11.6272
(0.5448)
ln Unemployment 8.1844
(0.8869)
ln Per Capita Grant 3.8773
(1.2609)
Political control
Labour 0.3152
Conservative 0.2818
Liberal Democrat 0.0562
Other 0.0725
Political Competition
Conservative-Labour 0.7194
Conservative-Lib Dem 0.0866
Labour-Lib Dem 0.0473
Conservative-Other 0.0333
Labour-Other 0.0466
Lib Dem-Other 0.0666
Authority Type
Inner London 0.0300
Outer London 0.0566
Metropolitan District 0.1020
Shire District 0.8114
Region
North 0.0807
North West 0.0866
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.0684
East Midlands 0.1117
West Midlands 0.1047
East Anglia 0.0568
South West 0.1009
South East 0.2623
Greater London 0.1280
Standard deviations in parentheses
Table 2: Performance Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
ln Total Expenditure 5.0760 1.0645
Band D Tax 6.4212 0.1651
Tax Collection Costs 17.3802 5.3117
% Tax Collected 0.9423 0.0406
ln Leisure Expenditure 1.9408 0.7480
ln Parks Expenditure 2.0657 0.7982
ln Refuse Expenditure 2.2357 0.2883
ln Transport Expenditure 1.3827 1.6882
ln Total Employment 2.6274 0.8749
ln Full Time Employment 2.3368 0.7728
ln Part Time Employment 1.0997 1.2349
% Rent Collected 0.9852 0.0225
% Housing Management Costs 10.2545 5.1089
Average rent 40.3254 9.7625
Planning decisions within 8 weeks 0.7374 0.1164
Benet costs 81.2243 32.7658
Table 3: Seats Votes Regression
All Lab-Con
Variable Coe¤ Coe¤
ln odds Vote Share 1.721 2.209
( 0.075 ) ( 0.071 )
Sample size 1004 747
R2 0.859 0.909
Standard error 0.344 0.175
WAuth 896.498 570.023
p value 0.000 0.000
Dependent variable is ln odds Seat Share
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedastic-
ity.
WAuth is a Wald test of absence of authority di¤erences, as-
ymptotically distributed as 2149
Table 4: Total Expenditure Regressions
All Lab-Con
OLS GLS GLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤
Pro inc bias 0.360 0.121 0.081
( 0.060) ( 0.041) ( 0.045)
Pro inc bias * Lab 0.158 0.565 0.528
( 0.054) ( 0.132 ) ( 0.201 )
Pro inc bias * Con -0.157 -0.389 0.034
( 0.105) ( 0.141 ) ( 0.257 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem 0.386 0.616
( 0.159) ( 0.192 )
Pro inc bias * Oth 0.072 -0.226
( 0.094) ( 0.208 )
Political control
Labour 0.089 0.084 0.012 0.035
( 0.016) ( 0.016) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.020 )
Conservative -0.116 -0.101 -0.034 -0.039
( 0.021) ( 0.023) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.022 )
Liberal Democrat 0.148 0.131 0.059
( 0.027) ( 0.029) ( 0.031 )
Other 0.007 0.011 -0.044
( 0.027) ( 0.029) ( 0.049 )
Characteristics
ln Average Income 0.048 -0.038 -0.003 0.243 0.374
( 0.097) ( 0.091) ( 0.092) ( 0.108 ) ( 0.141 )
ln Population -0.314 -0.204 -0.195 -0.091 -0.103
( 0.024) ( 0.027) ( 0.027) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.048 )
ln Unemployment 0.401 0.310 0.306 0.248 0.266
( 0.017) ( 0.018) ( 0.018) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.026 )
ln Per Capita Grant 0.056 0.063 0.061 0.005 -0.002
( 0.010) ( 0.009) ( 0.009) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.009 )
Sample size 2133 2133 2133 2133 2133 1535
No of years 14 14 14 14 14 14
1 0.134 0.141
2 0.079 0.048 0.043 0.043 0.164 0.168
WClass 19892.359 4834.774 5406.033 5254.296 1453.682 1024.631
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
WRegion 136.507 108.652 114.649 119.543 32.123 22.045
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
WY ear 1574.072 335.368 250.922 237.400 188.986 112.280
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dependent variable in all regressions is log of total expenditure
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation error in the districting advan-
tage variable.
1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and 2 the common component to the standard
error
WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di¤erences, asymptotically distrib-
uted as 23
WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di¤erences, asymptotically distributed
as 28
WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di¤erences, asymptotically distributed as 
2
with degrees of freedom one less than the no of years
Table 5: Tax Regressions
Band D Tax Tax Collection Cost % Tax Collected
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤
Pro inc bias * Lab 0.204 3.134 -0.046
( 0.090) ( 3.447) ( 0.023 )
Pro inc bias * Con 0.089 -2.307 -0.162
( 0.140) ( 6.226) ( 0.055 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem 0.126 -2.919 -0.008
( 0.108) ( 4.763) ( 0.029 )
Pro inc bias * Oth -0.264 13.117 -0.010
( 0.184) ( 7.039) ( 0.040 )
Political control
Labour -0.012 0.731 -0.004
( 0.012) ( 0.620) ( 0.004 )
Conservative -0.048 -0.992 0.022
( 0.016) ( 0.890) ( 0.007 )
Liberal Democrat 0.037 0.149 0.003
( 0.021) ( 0.991) ( 0.006 )
Other -0.026 2.066 -0.008
( 0.046) ( 1.853) ( 0.011 )
Characteristics
ln Average Income 0.024 0.082 -0.009
( 0.083) ( 4.236) ( 0.027 )
ln Population -0.027 -0.158 -0.020
( 0.033) ( 1.408) ( 0.009 )
ln Unemployment 0.075 -1.359 -0.003
( 0.021) ( 1.019) ( 0.006 )
ln Per Capita Grant -0.018 1.428 -0.017
( 0.013) ( 0.859) ( 0.005 )
Sample size 720 569 569
No of years 4 3 3
1 0.105 3.510 0.020
2 0.059 2.224 0.015
WClass 26.320 34.514 65.166
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
WRegion 38.791 8.292 6.999
p value 0.000 0.308 0.429
WY ear 261.570 12.051 28.217
p value 0.000 0.007 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation error in the districting advan-
tage variable.
All estimates by GLS
1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and 2 the common component to the standard
error
WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di¤erences, asymptotically distrib-
uted as 23
WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di¤erences, asymptotically distributed
as 28
WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di¤erences, asymptotically distributed as 
2
with degrees of freedom one less than the no of years
Table 6: Expenditure Regressions
Leisure Parks Refuse Transport
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤
Pro inc bias * Lab 0.892 1.716 -0.032 0.775
( 0.322) ( 0.331) ( 0.145) ( 0.619 )
Pro inc bias * Con -1.406 -0.641 -0.232 0.976
( 0.373) ( 0.307) ( 0.157) ( 0.690 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem 1.257 -0.057 0.649 -1.807
( 0.427) ( 0.367) ( 0.217) ( 0.913 )
Pro inc bias * Oth 0.056 -1.752 -0.245 -0.966
( 0.521) ( 0.783) ( 0.246) ( 1.222 )
Political control
Labour 0.127 0.042 0.035 0.004
( 0.041) ( 0.036) ( 0.019) ( 0.087 )
Conservative 0.027 -0.043 -0.039 -0.004
( 0.045) ( 0.037) ( 0.021) ( 0.092 )
Liberal Democrat 0.018 0.007 0.091 -0.126
( 0.068) ( 0.056) ( 0.034) ( 0.147 )
Other -0.152 -0.521 -0.110 -0.516
( 0.117) ( 0.186) ( 0.057) ( 0.284 )
Characteristics
ln Average Income -0.072 0.285 0.031 -1.170
( 0.252) ( 0.215) ( 0.121) ( 0.569 )
ln Population 0.157 0.841 0.069 -0.176
( 0.104) ( 0.104) ( 0.047) ( 0.191 )
ln Unemployment 0.137 -0.129 -0.071 0.049
( 0.049) ( 0.042) ( 0.023) ( 0.104 )
ln Per Capita Grant -0.026 0.007 0.001 -0.055
( 0.017) ( 0.014) ( 0.008) ( 0.038 )
Sample size 2118 2131 2132 1910
No of years 14 14 14 14
1 0.398 0.463 0.168 0.598
2 0.363 0.322 0.177 0.781
WClass 13.619 8.307 59.713 175.619
p value 0.003 0.040 0.000 0.000
WRegion 23.668 43.454 9.530 35.776
p value 0.001 0.000 0.217 0.000
WY ear 77.978 30.718 46.889 86.686
p value 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
Dependent variable in all regressions is log expenditure
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation error in the districting advan-
tage variable.
All estimates by GLS
1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and 2 the common component to the standard
error
WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di¤erences, asymptotically distrib-
uted as 23
WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di¤erences, asymptotically distributed
as 28
WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di¤erences, asymptotically distributed as 
2
with degrees of freedom one less than the no of years
Table 7: Employment Regressions
ln Total Employment ln Full time ln Part time
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤
Pro inc bias * Lab 1.269 1.340 1.026
( 0.186) ( 0.184) ( 0.283 )
Pro inc bias * Con -0.557 -0.546 -0.733
( 0.164) ( 0.156) ( 0.285 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem 0.379 0.514 -0.447
( 0.208) ( 0.203) ( 0.384 )
Pro inc bias * Oth -0.184 -0.108 -0.798
( 0.232) ( 0.215) ( 0.482 )
Political control
Labour 0.048 0.044 0.086
( 0.021) ( 0.021) ( 0.035 )
Conservative 0.003 -0.010 0.029
( 0.021) ( 0.020) ( 0.036 )
Liberal Democrat 0.001 -0.021 0.142
( 0.032) ( 0.031) ( 0.058 )
Other -0.134 -0.128 -0.247
( 0.054) ( 0.049) ( 0.114 )
Characteristics
ln Average Income 0.095 0.031 0.381
( 0.133) ( 0.125) ( 0.237 )
ln Population 0.275 0.317 0.104
( 0.047) ( 0.045) ( 0.084 )
ln Unemployment 0.018 0.012 0.005
( 0.023) ( 0.022) ( 0.041 )
ln Per Capita Grant 0.007 0.010 0.004
( 0.008) ( 0.007) ( 0.014 )
Sample size 1696 1696 1696
No of years 12 12 12
1 0.169 0.167 0.305
2 0.156 0.149 0.262
WClass 564.097 369.132 530.787
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
WRegion 25.097 41.809 2.813
p value 0.001 0.000 0.902
WY ear 77.454 127.919 17.852
p value 0.000 0.000 0.120
Dependent variable in all regressions is log employment
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation error in the districting advan-
tage variable.
All estimates by GLS
1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and 2 the common component to the standard
error
WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di¤erences, asymptotically distrib-
uted as 23
WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di¤erences, asymptotically distributed
as 28
WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di¤erences, asymptotically distributed as 
2
with degrees of freedom one less than the no of years
Table 8: Performance Regressions
% Rent Coll % Man costs Av rent Planning Bene t costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤ Coe¤
Pro inc bias * Lab 0.047 -6.664 -5.544 -0.148 1.799
( 0.019) ( 2.193) ( 3.346) ( 0.087) ( 18.712 )
Pro inc bias * Con 0.062 3.701 9.736 0.151 -12.820
( 0.047) ( 3.760) ( 5.804) ( 0.170) ( 33.028 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem 0.014 -1.393 -5.308 0.051 19.155
( 0.027) ( 2.614) ( 4.148) ( 0.127) ( 25.069 )
Pro inc bias * Oth -0.018 1.056 3.528 0.040 18.171
( 0.039) ( 4.840) ( 7.959) ( 0.163) ( 37.650 )
Political control
Labour 0.010 -0.217 -0.310 0.004 0.213
( 0.004) ( 0.330) ( 0.485) ( 0.018) ( 3.221 )
Conservative 0.006 0.073 0.564 0.000 1.224
( 0.006) ( 0.487) ( 0.721) ( 0.026) ( 4.598 )
Liberal Democrat -0.001 -0.156 0.829 0.013 -1.420
( 0.006) ( 0.596) ( 0.940) ( 0.026) ( 5.220 )
Other -0.005 0.534 -0.066 -0.012 4.149
( 0.011) ( 1.227) ( 1.972) ( 0.045) ( 9.667 )
Characteristics
ln Average Income 0.004 1.851 3.763 0.186 8.483
( 0.026) ( 2.376) ( 3.544) ( 0.115) ( 22.387 )
ln Population 0.015 -0.777 0.837 -0.134 10.581
( 0.008) ( 0.839) ( 1.299) ( 0.037) ( 7.561 )
ln Unemployment -0.015 0.715 -0.694 0.086 -7.681
( 0.006) ( 0.595) ( 0.896) ( 0.028) ( 5.381 )
ln Per Capita Grant 0.006 1.063 1.193 -0.022 4.907
( 0.005) ( 0.511) ( 0.780) ( 0.023) ( 4.559 )
Sample size 516 517 517 569 567
No of years 3 3 3 3 3
1 0.017 2.278 4.111 0.080 19.957
2 0.013 1.022 1.613 0.068 11.456
WClass 2.877 86.741 127.023 11.505 58.584
p value 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000
WRegion 8.109 13.353 89.527 12.128 5.739
p value 0.323 0.064 0.000 0.096 0.571
WY ear 12.336 34.990 206.185 1.100 1.508
p value 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.777 0.681
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation error in the districting advan-
tage variable.
All estimates by GLS
1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and 2 the common component to the standard
error
WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di¤erences, asymptotically distrib-
uted as 23
WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di¤erences, asymptotically distributed
as 28
WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di¤erences, asymptotically distributed as 
2
with degrees of freedom one less than the no of years
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Figure 1: Seats/Votes relationship
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Figure 2: Seats/Votes relationship for Con-Lab Sample
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